Bargaining with commitments by Juan Vidal-Puga
Bargaining with commitments∗
Juan J. Vidal-Puga
Departamento de Estatistica e IO
Universidade de Vigo




We study a simple bargaining mechanism in which each player puts a
prize to his resources before leaving the game. The only expected ﬁnal
equilibrium payoﬀ can be deﬁned by means of selective marginal contri-
butions vectors, and it coincides with the Shapley value for convex games.
Moreover, for 3-player games the selective marginal contributions vectors
determine the core when it is nonempty.
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Many economic situations can be modelled as a set of agents or players with
independent interests who may beneﬁc from cooperation. Once this cooperation
is carried out, the question which arises in how the beneﬁts from cooperation
should be distributed among the players.
This problem may be approached by taking two diﬀerent points of view:
one of them is axiomatic, or cooperative, and the other is non-cooperative. The
axiomatic point of view focuses on ﬁnding allocations which satisfy “fair” (or at
least “reasonable”) properties, such as eﬃciency (the ﬁnal outcome must be opti-
mal), symmetry (players with the same characteristics must receive the same),
etc. The non-cooperative point of view leads to the study of the allocations
which arise in a given non-cooperative environment.
In this paper, we focus on the non-cooperative approach. We study a non-
cooperative framework in the context of transferable utility games, where there
exists a divisible commodity that all agents value the same in terms of utility.
We consider a society in which individuals have mechanisms which allow
them to make absolute bindings at no cost. Schelling (1980) points out that, if
more than one individual simultaneous and uncoordinatedly commit themselves,
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1we may get ineﬃciency. Business can not take place if their commitments are
incompatible. Thus, we consider a protocol or order in which players commit
themselves, and study the allocations that arise in subgame perfect equilibria.
For a detailed discussion on the subject of commitments and its implica-
tions, the reader is referred to Crawford (1982), where he studies bargaining
environments in which each party can make a commitment which is costly to
remove (see also Muthoo, 1992, 1996, and Bolt and Houba, 1998). Schelling
(1980) points out that a player may enhance his degree of commitment through
delegating on a third party. Commitment through delegation may be found in
Katz (1991) and Fershtman and Kalai (1997). Delegation with possible renego-
tiation may be found in Haller and Holden (1997), Bester and Sákovics (2001),
and Corts and Neher (2003).
In our framework, players sequentially choose a prize for their resources and
commit themselves to that prize. Finally, the last player chooses the resources
he wants to buy and clears the market. This protocol generalizes the bargaining
game illustrated by Schelling (1980; Appendix B) as follows: two players may
divide $100 as soon as they agree on how to do it. The game terminates at
“midnight”, when the bell rings. In order to deﬁne “agreement”, it is supposed
that each player keeps his current oﬀer recorded in a way that a referee can
check both oﬀers when the bell rings. If the two players have jointly claimed
more than $100, they get nothing. If they have jointly claimed no more than
$100, the gains are divided in accordance. The presence of commitments is
illustrated by a “turnstile that permits a player to leave but not to return; his
current oﬀer as he goes through the turnstile remains on the books until the
bell rings” (Schelling 1980, p. 276).
Several possible extensions of this mechanism for more than two players are
given under the generic name of Demand Commitment Game. They are dis-
cussed in Bennet and van Damme (1991), Selten (1992), Winter (1994), and
Dasgupta and Chiu (1998). A common feature in these models is that, if one
or more players “go through the turnstile” demanding a feasible amount (i.e.
whatever they can assure by themselves is not less than the sum of their com-
mitments), they may form a coalition and leave the game. Thus, some players
may leave the game before all the others have a chance to move. In our model,
every player (but the last one) commits to a prize. Our mechanism improves on
previous ones in two aspects. First, the mechanism is simpler. Second, the range
of results is increased. In Winter’s and Dasgupta and Chiu’s, the Shapley value
arises for convex games. But if the game is not convex the equilibrium payoﬀ
may be ineﬃcient1. We show that in our mechanism the equilibrium outcome
is always eﬃcient in a nonrestrictive class of games, and it coincides with the
Shapley value for convex games. For 3-player games, Dasgupta and Chiu show
that all the possible outcomes constitute the vertices of the core, when the core
1In Dasgupta and Chiu’s model, eﬃciency in the non convex case is achieved by means of
prizes and penalties from the planner to the players. For penalties large enough, the Shapley
value arises for any game, and the planner does not gain nor loose anything in equilibrium.
We think this result is unsatisfactory. For example, there may be a utility transfer to the
players from outside out of the equilibrium path.
2has nonempty interior. We prove that this result also applies in our mechanism.
Furthermore, the outcome is also characterized for simple games.
In Section 2, we introduce the notation used throughout the paper. In
Section 3 we deﬁne a new value for cooperative games, the selective value,b a s e d
on selective marginal contributions vectors. We also study the selective value
in some important classes of games. In particular, the selective value coincides
with the Shapley value for convex games. In Section 4 we formally describe
the non-cooperative mechanism2; and we prove that the selective value is the
only expected ﬁnal payoﬀ in subgame perfect equilibria. We have then given an
additional non-cooperative motivation to the Shapley value for convex games.
2 The model
We begin with some basic notations. Given a ﬁnite set A,b y2A we denote the
cardinal set of A,b y|A| the cardinality of A,a n db yRA the set of real |A|-
tuples whose indices are the elements of A. Given a function f : S ⊂ 2A → R,
by argmax
T⊂S
{f (T)} we denote the set of subsets T ⊂ S which maximize f (T).
Let (N,v) be a TU game with transferable utility (TU game), where N =
{1,2,...,n} is the set of players and v is the characteristic function, which assigns
ar e a ln u m b e rv(S) to every coalition S ⊂ N, S 6= ∅ and v(∅)=0 . This value
v (S) represents the utility that players in S are able to achieve by themselves
when playing cooperatively. Following usual practice, we often refer to “the
game v” instead of “the TU game (N,v)”. We denote by TU(N) the set of all
TU games on the set of players N.W ed e n o t eb yTU the set of all TU games.
We say that v is convex if v(T) − v(T\{i}) ≤ v(S) − v (S\{i}) when
i ∈ T ⊂ S, zero-monotonic if v(S)+v({i}) ≤ v(S ∪ {i}) when i/ ∈ S,a n d
strictly zero-monotonic if v(S)+v({i}) <v (S ∪ {i}) when i/ ∈ S.N o t i c et h a t
if the game is convex then it is zero-monotonic. We say that v is monotonic if
v (T) ≤ v(S) whenever T ⊂ S.







xi ≥ v(S) for all S ⊂ N. The core of a game may be empty.
However, if the game is convex, its core is nonempty.
Let Π be the set of all orders on N.G i v e nπ ∈ Π and i ∈ N,w ed e ﬁne the
set of predecessors of i under π as the set of players who come before i under
the order π.N a m e l y ,
Pπ
i := {j ∈ N : π(j) < π(i)}.
We also denote Pπ
i := Pπ
i ∪ {i}.










2In order to avoid ambiguities, we use the term non-cooperative mechanism,o rs i m p l y
mechanism, when referring to a non-cooperative game.
3This notation diﬀers from the usual3. However, this one is more suitable for
our purposes. For simplicity, we write dπ
i instead of dπ
i (v) and dπ instead of
dπ (v).
The marginal contributions vectors can be explained as follows. All the
players are together in a room. They sequentially leave the room, and by doing
so each leaving player receives his marginal contribution to the players still in
the room; i.e. the diﬀerence between what players can get by themselves before
and after he leaves the room.
We deﬁne the Weber set W (v) of v as the convex hull whose vertices are
the vectors dπ’s. If v is convex, W (v)=C (v).
A value on G ⊂ TU(N) is a map f : G −→ RN.T h eShapley value (Shapley,












v(N).Av a l u ef on G satisﬁes core selection if f (v) ∈ C (v) for all v ∈ G such
that C (v) 6= ∅.
We say that v is a simple game if v(S) ∈ {0,1} for all S ⊂ N and v(N)=1 .
Ap l a y e ri in a simple game is a veto player if i/ ∈ S implies v(S)=0 .T h ec o r e
of a monotonic simple game v with set of veto players T ⊂ N is the convex hull
of imputations x ∈ RN which satisfy xi ≥ 0 for all i ∈ T,
P
i∈T
xi =1and xi =0
for all i ∈ N\T.T h u s ,t h ec o r eo fv is nonempty if and only if T 6= ∅.
3 The selective value
We deﬁne a selective marginal contribution of a player. As the marginal con-
tributions, imagine all players sequentially leave a room. Again, a player gets
the diﬀerence between what players can get by themselves before and after he
leaves the room. However, in computing what a coalition gets by itself, we as-
sume its members may select some of the players already outside the room and
use their resources by paying the prize they got on leaving. We think that this
interpretation may justify the term selective marginal contributions.
Formally, let π ∈ Π. We can assume without loss of generality that π =
(1...n).
We deﬁne the selective marginal contribution of player i ∈ N in the order N
as











































for i =1 ,2,...,n − 1 and
eπ
















For simplicity, we write eπ
i instead of eπ
i (v) and eπ instead of eπ (v).
Notice that what a coalition N\Pπ













; i.e. the coalition can select some of the players
already outside the room and use their resources by paying their prize.
Notice that
eπ
1 = v(N) − v(N\{1})=dπ
1. (1)
Next lemma provides a simpliﬁcation of these formulas.






















Proof. We assume π =( 1 2 ...n). We proceed by induction on i.F o ri =1
the result is trivial, since Pπ
1 = ∅. Assume the result is true for 1,2,...,i − 1.
Let S0 ⊂ Pπ












Let k =m a x{j : j ∈ S0}. Hence, S0\{k} ⊂ Pπ
k . By induction hypothesis
eπ































from where (2) is easily deduced.
5W ec a nt h e nd e ﬁne the eπ’s as
eπ




















for i =1 ,...,n − 1 and
eπ






Analogously to the Weber set, we deﬁne Wσ (v) as the convex hull whose
vertices are the vectors eπ’s.
Given a TU game v,w ed e ﬁne the selective value σ(v) as the vector of







Next proposition characterizes the selective value in convex games, mono-
tonic simple games and zero-monotonic 3-player games with nonempty core.
Proposition 2 a) If v is convex, then the selective value coincides with the
Shapley value.
b) Let (N,v) be a monotonic simple game, and let T be the set of veto players.
Then, the selective value is given by
1. If T 6= ∅
σi (v)=
½ 1
|T| if i ∈ T
0 if i/ ∈ T




for all i ∈ N.
c) Let v be a zero-monotonic game with n =3and nonempty core C (v).
Then, the selective marginal contributions vectors are the vertices of the core.
In particular,
Wσ (v)=C (v).
The proof of Proposition 2 is located in the Appendix. Next corollary is
immediate:
Corollary 3 The selective value satisﬁes core selection for convex games, mono-
tonic simple games and zero-monotonic 3 player games.
6Proposition 2a) allows us to extend the results of Winter (1994) and Das-
gupta and Chiu (1998) (cf. Theorem 5 below). Winter (1994, p. 271) suggests
that the Shapley value is most adequate in convex games. For non-convex
games, the selective value does not coincide with the Shapley value. However,
it shows a bigger “stability” (in the sense of “core selection”) in both simple
games (Proposition 2b)) and 3 player games (Proposition 2c)). Proposition 2c),
together with the theorems in next section, also extends Theorem 5 in Dasgupta
and Chiu (1998).
Remark 4 Proposition 2c) does not hold for n>3. For example, consider the
symmetric game v with n =4given by v(N) = 100, v(S)=5 0if |S| =2or
|S| =3 ,a n dv(S)=0o t h e r w i s e .T h ec o r eo ft h i sg a m eh a sas i n g l ei m p u t a t i o n
(25,25,25,25). However, e(1234) =( 5 0 ,0,0,50) / ∈ C (v).
4 The bargaining mechanism with commitments
We deﬁne here the bargaining mechanism with commitments. The mechanism
has n rounds. In the ﬁrst round, a player is randomly chosen, being each player
equally likely to be chosen. Say, player 1 is chosen. Player 1 must then make a
commitment c1 ∈ R. Another player (say, player 2) is again randomly chosen
among the members of N\{1}.P l a y e r 2,a w a r eo fp l a y e r1’s choice, must
make a new commitment c2 ∈ R, and so on. When the turn reaches player
n, he faces a vector c ∈ RN\{n} of commitments. He must then propose a
coalition E ⊂ N\{n} and he gets the resources of N\E by paying ci to every




ci for player n,a n dv({i}) for every i ∈ E.W es a yt h e n
that players in E are excluded.
Next theorem shows that the selective value arises in the bargaining mech-
anism with commitments as the only expected subgame perfect equilibrium
payoﬀ.
Theorem 5 For strictly zero-monotonic games, there exists a unique expected
subgame perfect equilibrium payoﬀ; and it is the selective value.
To prove this result, we need two lemmas. In order to simplify notation,
given a game (N,v), a coalition S ⊂ N,ap l a y e ri ∈ N\S and a vector c ∈ RS,
we deﬁne
































































We also denote by M (S,i,c) the subgame which begins when, after players
in S ⊂ N\{n} have stated their commitments c ∈ RS,i ti sp l a y e ri’s turn. If
S = ∅,w ew r i t eM (∅,i).
Lemma 6 If v is zero-monotonic, v({i}) ≤ AS (c) − BS
i (c) for all S ⊂ N,
i ∈ N\S,a n dc ∈ RS.I fv is strictly zero-monotonic, the inequality is strict.































which is precisely BS
i (c)+v({i}). Hence, AS (c) ≥ BS
i (c)+v({i}),a n dt h u s
the result holds. The proof for strict inequality is analogous.
Lemma 7 Let v be a strictly zero-monotonic game. Assume we are in a sub-
game perfect equilibrium of the subgame M (S,i,c) and S 6= N\{i} (i.e. player
i has to commit). Then, player i commits to ci = AS (c)−BS
i (c), and he is not
excluded.
Proof. Assume we are in the subgame M (N\{α},α,c) for some α ∈ N,
c ∈ RN\{α} (i.e. player α is due to choose the set of excluded players). Then,














Assume now we are in the subgame M (S,i,c) with S 6= N\{i}. We proceed
by a series of claims:
Claim (A):I fp l a y e ri commits to ci <A S (c) − BS
i (c),t h e nh ei sn o t
excluded.
Claim (B):P l a y e ri commits to ci ≥ AS (c) − BS
i (c).
Claim (C):I fp l a y e ri commits to ci >A S (c)−BS
i (c), then he is excluded.
Claim (D):P l a y e ri commits to ci = AS (c)−BS
i (c), and he is not excluded.
8We proceed by backwards induction on |S|.A s s u m e|S| = n − 2, i.e. player
i is the last to make a commitment before the last player (say, α)c l e a r st h e
market. Notice that S = N\{α,i}.
P r o o fo fC l a i m( A )f o r|S| = n − 2. Assume that ci <A S (c) − BS
i (c).































= AS (c) − ci
>B S




























But this contradicts (3). Thus, i/ ∈ E, i.e. player i is not excluded, and
therefore his ﬁnal payoﬀ is ci.
P r o o fo fC l a i m( B )f o r|S| = n − 2.A s s u m e ci <A S (c) − BS
i (c).B y
Claim (A), player i can improve his ﬁnal payoﬀ by committing to c0
i such that
ci <c 0
i <A S (c) − BS
i (c). Hence, ci ≥ AS (c) − BS
i (c) in equilibrium.
P r o o fo fC l a i m( C )f o r|S| = n − 2.A s s u m e ci >A S (c) − BS
i (c).W e
prove that i ∈ E. Suppose, on the contrary, that i/ ∈ E.T h e n E ⊂ S.L e t




























































Again, this contradicts (3). Thus, i ∈ E and player i’s ﬁnal payoﬀ is v({i}).
Proof of Claim (D) for |S| = n − 2.A s s u m ep l a y e ri is excluded. Thus,
his ﬁnal payoﬀ is v({i}). By Lemma 6, this is strictly less than what he would
get by committing to c0
i with v({i}) <c 0
i <A π (c) − Bπ
i (c).T h u s ,p l a y e ri is
not excluded. By Claim (C), this means that ci ≤ Aπ (c) − Bπ
i (c).B yC l a i m
(B), equality holds.
Assume now the claims are true for subgames M (T,j,c0) with |T| > |S|.
P r o o fo fC l a i m( A ) .A s s u m et h a tci <A S (c)−BS
i (c).W eh a v et op r o v e
that i/ ∈ E. Suppose, on the contrary, that i ∈ E. By induction hypothesis, no
player in N\(S ∪ {i}) is excluded. Thus, E ⊂ S ∪ {i}.























































10But this contradicts (3). Thus, i/ ∈ E and player i’s ﬁnal payoﬀ is ci.
P r o o fo fC l a i m( B ) . Analogous to the case |S| = n − 2.
P r o o fo fC l a i m( C ) .A s s u m eci >A S (c) − BS
i (c). W eh a v et op r o v e
that i ∈ E. Suppose, on the contrary, that i/ ∈ E. By applying the induction



































































Again, this contradicts (3). Thus, i ∈ E and player i’s ﬁnal payoﬀ is v({i}).
P r o o fo fC l a i m( D ) . Analogous to the case |S| = n − 2.
An immediate consequence of Lemma 7 is that the equilibrium payoﬀ of
any player depends on the identity of the players who come before and after
him but not on the way they are ordered. This feature distinguishes our model
from Dasgupta and Chiu’s (1991), where the order in which players make their
demands is prespeciﬁed at the beginning of the mechanism and known by all
players.
Next remark is important for the proof of Theorem 10 and Theorem 11
below.
Remark 8 Zero-monotonicity is only needed in the proof of Claim (D).
P r o o fo fT h e o r e m5 . By Lemma 7, the only possible payoﬀ in equilibrium
is eπ,w h e r eπ ∈ Π is given by the order in which the players commit. We
must prove that there exists an equilibrium. We consider the following set of
strategies: In the subgame M (S,i,c),p l a y e ri commits to ci = AS (c)−BS
i (c).
11If player i is the last one (i.e. S = N\{i}), he excludes a coalition E ⊂ N\{i}














In case of indiﬀerence, player i chooses a coalition E with the minimum
cardinality |E|.
Clearly, the ﬁnal payoﬀ when players follow this set of strategies is eπ.I f
player i commits to less than AS (c) − BS
i (c), he is not excluded (Claim (A)),
but his ﬁnal payoﬀ decreases. If he commits to more than AS (c) − BS
i (c),h e
is excluded (Claim (C)) and his ﬁnal payoﬀ is v({i}). However, by Lemma 6,
this amount is less than eπ
i . Thus, it is not optimal for him to deviate. We are
then in a subgame perfect equilibrium.
If we consider zero-monotonic games, there exists a subgame perfect equi-
librium whose expected payoﬀ outcome coincides with the selective value. A
possible equilibrium is the one presented in the proof of Theorem 5. However,
there may exist subgame perfect equilibria whose expected ﬁnal payoﬀ outcome
is diﬀerent from the selective value. Consider the next example.
Example 9 Let v be the “two-left-one-right-glove” 3-player game given by v(N)=
v ({1,3})=v ({2,3})=1and v(S)=0otherwise. The selective value of v is
the only core allocation (0,0,1). We consider the following strategies: Players
2 and 3 play according the strategies described in the proof of Theorem 5, which
implement the selective value. However, if the set given in (4) contains more
than one coalition, player 3 will exclude the ﬁrst coalition in (4) given the pref-
erence relation ∅ Â{ 1}Â{ 2}Â{ 1,2}. Moreover, player 1 plays according
these strategies except in the subgame M(∅,1), where he commits to c1 =1 .
It is not diﬃc u l tt oc h e c kt h a tt h e s es t r a t e g i e sc o n s t i t u t eas u b g a m ep e r f e c t
equilibrium. When the order in which the players are asked is diﬀerent from
(123),t h eﬁnal payoﬀ is (0,0,1). When the order is (123),t h eﬁnal payoﬀ is
(0,1,0). Hence, the selective value is not achieved.
If we want to obtain the selective value for general zero-monotonic games,
we have to make additional assumptions. For example, Moldovanu and Winter
(1994) assume that “each player prefers to be a member of large coalitions
rather than smaller ones provided that he earns the same payoﬀ in the two
agreements”. If we make the same assumption in our model, the selective value
is implemented. Formally, we consider the following tie-breaking rule:
• If a player i is indiﬀerent between committing to c0
i or ci and c0
i <c i,h e
strictly prefers to commit himself to c0
i.
• If the last player is indiﬀerent between excluding E0 or E and E0 Ã E,h e
strictly prefers to exclude E0.
12Theorem 10 When players follow the tie-breaking rule in zero-monotonic games,
the selective value is the unique expected subgame perfect equilibrium payoﬀ.
Proof. The set of strategies used in the proof of Theorem 5 constitutes a
subgame perfect equilibrium for the bargaining mechanism, and furthermore it
satisﬁes the tie-breaking rule.
Now, we prove that, with this tie-breaking rule, Lemma 7 still holds for (not-
strictly) zero-monotonic games. More speciﬁcally, Claims (A), (B), (C) and (D)
hold. Furthermore, the proof of Claims (A), (B) and (C) are analogous. We
m u s tp r o v eC l a i m( D )f o rt h en e wh y p o t h e s i s .
P r o o fo fC l a i m( D )f o r|S| = n − 2. By Claim (A), Claim (C) and the
tie-breaking rule, we deduce that ci = AS (c) − BS
i (c).W eh a v et op r o v et h a t
player i is not excluded. Assume he is excluded, i.e. i ∈ E.
If v({i}) <A S (c) − BS
i (c), by Claim (A) he can improve his ﬁnal payoﬀ
by committing to c0
i with v({i}) <c 0
i <A S (c) − BS
i (c).T h u s , v({i})=
AS (c) − BS
i (c);i . e .v({i})=ci.




















and thus player α is indiﬀerent between excluding E or E0.S i n c eE Ã E0,h e
does not follow the tie-breaking rule. This contradiction proves that player i
cannot be excluded.
P r o o fo fC l a i m( D ) . Analogous to the case |S| = n − 2.
Thus, the only possible payoﬀ in equilibrium is eπ.
Vidal-Puga and Bergantiños (2003) model this tie-breaking rule by “punish-
ing” with a small penalty ε > 0 the players involved in an exclusion. We can
do the same in our model. In particular, we assume each excluded player must
pay ε > 0.W e c a l l t h i s m o d i ﬁcation the ε-bargaining mechanism with com-
mitments. The structure of the mechanism is the same as before. This means
that the strategies available for playersa r et h es a m ei nb o t hm e c h a n i s m s .T h e
only diﬀerence lies on the following aspect of the payoﬀ function. When the last
player presents a coalition E of excluded players, the ﬁnal payoﬀ is v({i}) − ε
for each i ∈ E.
Theorem 11 For any ε > 0,t h eε-bargaining mechanism with commitments
has a unique expected subgame perfect equilibrium payoﬀ for zero-monotonic
games, and it is the selective value.
Proof. By analogous arguments to those presented in the proof of Theorem
10, we only need to prove Claim (D) of Lemma 7. Assume player i commits
to ci = AS (c) − BS
i (c) and it is excluded. Then, his ﬁnal payoﬀ is v({i}) − ε.
13By Lemma 6 and Claim (A), this is strictly less than what he would get by
committing to c0
i with v({i}) − ε <c 0
i <A S (c) − BS
i (c). This contradiction
proves the Claim.
Remark 12 As in Vidal-Puga and Bergantiños (2003), the result is also true
if the penalty to the excluded players is agent-dependent, i.e., any player i has
ap e n a l t yε(i) > 0 for being excluded.
5A p p e n d i x

















We proceed by induction on π (i).F o r π (i)=1 , (5) is trivial and (6)
coincides with (1). Assume π(i) > 1 and the results are true for all j such that
π (j) < π(i).L e tS ⊂ Pπ












We prove (7) by inverse induction on |S|.F o rS = Pπ
i ,i ti st r i v i a l .A s s u m e
(7) is true for coalitions T ⊂ Pπ
i such that |S| < |T| ≤ |Pπ
i |.L e ti∗ be the ﬁrst
player in Pπ
i \S, i.e. the only player in argmin
j∈P π
i \S
{π(j)}.T h u s
Pπ
i∗ ⊂ S. (8)
Let S∗ := S ∪ {i∗} ⊂ Pπ




















i∗ ⊂ S ∪{i,i∗}.T h u s ,N\Pπ















, we apply (10) to (9) in order to obtain
(7).
14We prove now (6)
eπ








































= v(N) − [v(N) − v(N\Pπ













This completes the proof of part a).
b) Let π ∈ Π. We can assume without loss of generality that π = (123...n).
Assume ﬁrst T 6= ∅.L e t i0 ∈ T be the ﬁrst veto player in the order π.
We prove that eπ
i =0for all i<i 0 by induction on i.F o r i =1 , eπ
1 =
v (N) − v(N\{1})=0because v is monotonic and 1 is not a veto player.
Assume eπ
j =0for 1 ≤ j<i .S i n c ej<i 0 and i0 is the ﬁrst veto player in π,
we deduce that j is not a veto player. By induction hypothesis
eπ





= v(N) − v(N\{j})
which equals 0 because v is monotonic and j is not a veto player.
Now, we calculate eπ
i0.I fi0 <n ,
eπ
i0 = v(N) − max
S⊂P π
i0
v(N\(S ∪ {i0})) = v(N) − v(N\{i0})=1 .
If i0 = n,
eπ
i0 = v (N)=1 .
Let i>i 0.W ec a l c u l a t eeπ
i .I fi<n ,
eπ
i = v(N) − 1 − max{v(N\{i}) − 1,v(N\{i,i0})}
= −max{v(N\{i}) − 1,0} =0 .
If i = n,
eπ
i = v(N) − 1=0 .
Thus, eπ
i0 =1and eπ
i =0otherwise. Since each veto player has the same
probability of being the ﬁrst one in an order π ∈ Π, we conclude the result.
15Assume now T = ∅.W ep r o v eeπ
i =0for all i<nby induction on i.F o r
i =1 , eπ
1 = v(N) − v (N\{1})=0because v is monotonic and 1 is not a veto
player. Assume eπ
j =0for j<i<n . By induction hypothesis
eπ
i = v(N) − v(N\{i})
which equals 0 because v is monotonic and player i is not a veto player.
Finally, eπ
n = v(N)=1 .T h u s , eπ
n =1and eπ
i =0otherwise. Since each
player has the same probability of being the last one in an order, we conclude
t h er e s u l to fp a r tb ) .
c) The proof is similar to those of Theorem 5 in Dasgupta and Chiu (1998),
although the computations are diﬀerent. Let v be a zero-monotonic game with
n =3and nonempty core C (v).W eﬁrst prove4
max{yi : y ∈ C (v)} = v(N) − v(N\i) (11)
for all i ∈ N.
Let xi =m a x {yi : y ∈ C (v)}. We can assume without loss of generality
that i =1 .
For any y ∈ C (v), y2 +y3 ≥ v(23).S i n c ey1 +y2 +y3 = v(N), we conclude
y1 ≤ v(N) − v (23) = v(N) − v(N\1).T h u s ,x1 ≤ v(N) − v(N\1).
Let y ∈ C (v) such that y1 <v(N) − v(N\1).
If y2 = v(2) and y3 = v(3), by zero-monotonicity
y1 = v(N) − [v(2) + v(3)] ≥ v(N) − v(23) = v(N) − v(N\1).
Thus, y2 >v(2) or y3 >v(3). We assume without loss of generality that
y2 >v(2).
Let
0 < ε < min{v(N) − v(N\1) − y1,y 2 − v(2)}.
Let yε = y+(ε,−ε,0).I ti sn o td i ﬃcult to check that yε ∈ C (v).M o r e o v e r ,
yε
1 >y 1.T h u s ,x1 = v (N) − v(N\1).T h i sp r o v e s( 1 1 ) .
Let π ∈ Π. We assume without loss of generality that π = (123).
We deﬁne xπ as the vertex of C (v) associated to π.N a m e l y
xπ
1 =m a x {y1 : y ∈ C (v)}
xπ
2 =m a x {y2 : y ∈ C (v),y 1 = x1}
xπ
3 = v(N) − xπ
1 − xπ
2.
We prove that xπ = eπ. By (11)
xπ
1 = v(N) − v(23) = eπ
1.
4In this section, we use v (N\1) instead of the more cumbersome v (N\{1}). Similarly,
v (ij)=v ({i,j}) and so on.
16Moreover
eπ
2 = v(N) − eπ
1 − max{v(13) − eπ
1,v(3)}
= v(23) − max{v(13) − v(N)+v(23),v(3)}.
We study two cases
Case 1: v(13) − v(N)+v(23) ≥ v(3).T h e n
eπ
2 = v(23) − v(13) + v(N) − v (23) = v(N) − v(13).
We show that
v(N) − v(13) = max{y2 : y ∈ C (v),y 1 = v(N) − v(23)} = xπ
2.
Let y ∈ C (v) such that y1 = v(N) − v(23).T h e n
y2 = v(N) − y1 − y3 = v(23) − y3
since y ∈ C (v),w eh a v ey1 + y3 ≥ v(13) and thus
≤ v(23) + y1 − v(13) = v(N) − v(13).
Therefore, xπ
2 ≤ v(N) − v(13).
Let y ∈ C (v) such that y1 = v(N) − v(23) and y2 <v(N) − v(13).W e
consider yε := y +( 0 ,ε,−ε) with 0 < ε <v (N) − v(13) − y2.S o , yε
1 =
v (N) − v(23). It is straightforward to show that yε ∈ C (v).
Thus, xπ
2 = v(N) − v(13) = eπ
2.
Case 2: v(13) − v(N)+v(23) <v(3).T h e n
eπ
2 = v(23) − v(3).
We show that v(23) − v(3) = max{y2 : y ∈ C (v),y 1 = v(N) − v(23)} =
xπ
2.
Let y ∈ C (v) such that y1 = v(N) − v(23).T h e n
y2 = v(N) − y1 − y3 = v(23) − y3
since y ∈ C (v),w eh a v ey3 ≥ v(3) and thus
≤ v(23) − v (3).
Therefore, xπ
2 ≤ v(N) − v(3).
Let y ∈ C (v) such that y1 = v (N) − v(23) and y2 <v (23) − v(3).W e
consider yε := y +( 0 ,ε,−ε) with 0 < ε <v(23) − v(3) − y2.S o ,yε
1 = v(N) −
v (23). It is straightforward to show that yε ∈ C (v).
Thus, we conclude that xπ
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